DOI: 10.1126/science.1136930
, 1002 (2007);
316 Science Paula M. Niedenthal
Embodying Emotion
This copy is for your personal, non-commercial use only.
clicking here.colleagues, clients, or customers by , you can order high-quality copies for your If you wish to distribute this article to others
here.following the guidelines can be obtained by Permission to republish or repurpose articles or portions of articles
): November 29, 2011 www.sciencemag.org (this infomation is current as of The following resources related to this article are available online at
http://www.sciencemag.org/content/316/5827/1002.full.html version of this article at:
including high-resolution figures, can be found in the online Updated information and services, http://www.sciencemag.org/content/316/5827/1002.full.html#related found at:
can be related to this article A list of selected additional articles on the Science Web sites 73 article(s) on the ISI Web of Science cited by This article has been http://www.sciencemag.org/content/316/5827/1002.full.html#related-urls 50 articles hosted by HighWire Press; see:cited by This article has been
http://www.sciencemag.org/cgi/collection/psychology Psychology
subject collections:This article appears in the following registered trademark of AAAS.
is a Science 2007 by the American Association for the Advancement of Science; all rights reserved. The title Copyright American Association for the Advancement of Science, 1200 New York Avenue NW, Washington, DC 20005. (print ISSN 0036-8075; online ISSN 1095-9203) is published weekly, except the last week in December, by the Science o n N o v e m b e r 29, 2011
w w w .s c i e n c e m a g .o r g D o w n l o a d e d f r o m
28.T.D.Wilson,Strangers to Ourselves:Discovering the
Adaptive Unconscious (Belknap Press,Cambridge,MA,2002).
29.E.Fehr,J.Henrich,in Genetic and Cultural Evolution of
Cooperation ,P.Hammerstein,Ed.(MIT Press,Cambridge,MA,2003).
30.E.Durkheim,The Elementary Forms of the Religious Life
(1915;reprint,The Free Press,New York,1965).31.M.A.Nowak,K.Sigmund,Nature 437,1291
(2005).
32.K.Panchanathan,R.Boyd,Nature 432,499
(2004).
33.J.Maynard Smith,E.Szathmary,The Major Transitions in
Evolution (Oxford Univ.Press,Oxford,UK,1997).34.G.C.Williams,Adaptation and Natural Selection:
A Critique of Some Current Evolutionary Thought (Princeton Univ.Press,Princeton,NJ,1966).
35.
D.S.Wilson,Darwin ’s Cathedral:Evolution,Religion,and the Nature of Society (Univ.of Chicago Press,Chicago,IL,2002).
36.S.Bowles,Science 314,1569(2006).
37.
A.Newberg,E.D ’Aquili,V.Rause,Why God Won ’t Go Away:Brain Science and the Biology of Belief (Ballantine,New York,2001).
38.
W.H.McNeill,Keeping Together in Time:Dance and Drill in Human History (Harvard Univ.Press,Cambridge,MA,1995).
39.V.Gallese,C.Keysers,G.Rizzolatti,Trends Cogn.Sci.8,396(2004).
40.
R.A.Shweder,N.C.Much,M.Mahapatra,L.Park,in
Morality and Health ,A.Brandt,P.Rozin,Eds.(Routledge,New York,1997),pp.119–169.
41.J.Haidt,J.Graham,Soc.Justice Res.,in press.
42.J.Haidt,C.Joseph,in The Innate Mind ,P.Carruthers,
S.Laurence,S.Stich,Eds.(Oxford Univ.Press,New York,in press),vol.3.
43.I thank D.Batson,R.Boyd,D.Fessler,J.Graham,
J.Greene,M.Hauser,D.Wegner,D.Willingham,and D.S.Wilson for helpful comments and corrections.
Supporting Online Material
www.sciencemag.org/cgi/content/full/316/5827/998/DC1Figs.S1and S2References
10.1126/science.1137651
Embodying Emotion
Paula M.Niedenthal*
Recent theories of embodied cognition suggest new ways to look at how we process emotional information.The theories suggest that perceiving and thinking about emotion involve perceptual,somatovisceral,and motoric reexperiencing (collectively referred to as “embodiment ”)of the relevant emotion in one ’s self.The embodiment of emotion,when induced in human participants by manipulations of facial expression and posture in the laboratory,causally affects how emotional information is processed.Congruence between the recipient ’s bodily expression of emotion and the sender ’s emotional tone of language,for instance,facilitates comprehension of the
communication,whereas incongruence can impair comprehension.Taken all together,recent findings provide a scientific account of the familiar contention that “when you ’re smiling,the whole world smiles with you.”
H
ere is a thought experiment:A man goes into a bar to tell a new joke.Two people are already in the bar.One is
smiling and one is frowning.Who is more likely to “get ”the punch line and appreciate his joke?Here is another:Two women are walking over a bridge.One is afraid of heights,so her heart pounds and her hands tremble.The other is not afraid at all.On the other side of the bridge,they encounter a man.Which of the two women is more likely to believe that she has just met the man of her dreams?
You probably guessed that the first person of the pair described in each problem was the right answer.Now consider the following experimen-tal findings:
1)While adopting either a conventional working posture or one of two so-called ergo-nomic postures,in which the back was straight and the shoulders were held high and back or in which the shoulders and head were slumped,experimental participants learned that they had succeeded on an achievement test completed earlier.Those who received the good news in the slumped posture felt less proud and reported being in a worse mood than participants in the upright or working posture (1).
2)Images that typically evoke emotionally “positive ”and “negative ”responses were pre-sented on a computer screen.Experimental participants were asked to indicate when a picture appeared by quickly moving a lever.Some participants were instructed to push a lever away from their body,whereas others were told to pull a lever toward their body.Par-ticipants who pushed the lever away responded to negative images faster than to positive im-ages,whereas participants who pulled the lever toward themselves responded faster to positive images (2).
3)Under the guise of studying the quality of different headphones,participants were induced either to nod in agreement or to shake their heads in disagreement.While they were “test-ing ”their headphones with one of these two movements,the experimenter placed a pen on the table in front of them.Later,a different ex-perimenter offered the participants the pen that had been placed on the table earlier or a novel pen.Individuals who were nodding their heads preferred the old pen,whereas participants who had been shaking their heads preferred the new one (3).
All of these studies show that there is a reciprocal relationship between the bodily ex-pression of emotion and the way in which emotional information is attended to and in-terpreted (Fig.1).Charles Darwin himself de-fined attitude as a collection of motor behaviors (especially posture)that conveys an organism ’s emotional response toward an object (4).Thus,
it would not have come as any surprise to him that the human body is involved in the ac-quisition and use of attitudes and preferences.Indeed,one speculates that Darwin would be satisfied to learn that research reveals that (i)when individuals adopt emotion-specific pos-tures,they report experiencing the associated emotions;(ii)when individuals adopt facial expressions or make emotional gestures,their preferences and attitudes are influenced;and (iii)when individuals ’motor movements are in-hibited,interference in the experience of emo-tion and processing of emotional information is observed (5).The causal relationship between embodying emotions,feeling emotional states,
Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS)and University of Clermont-Ferrand,France.E-mail:niedenthal@wisc.edu
*Present address:Laboratoire de Psychologie Sociale et Cognitive,UniversitéBlaise Pascal,34Avenue Carnot,63037Clermont-Ferrand,
France.
Fig.1.Two ways in which facial expression has been manipulated in behavioral experiments.(Top )In order to manipulate contraction of the brow muscle in a simulation of negative affect,researchers have affixed golf tees to the inside of participants ’eye-brows (42).Participants in whom negative emotion was induced were instructed to bring the ends of the golf tees together,as in the right panel.[Photo credit:Psychology Press].(Bottom )In other research,par-ticipants either held a pen between the lips to inhibit smiling,as in the left panel,or else held the pen between the teeth to facilitate smiling (39).
18MAY 2007VOL 316
SCIENCE
www.sciencemag.org
1002REVIEWS
o n N o v e m b e r 29, 2011
w w w .s c i e n c e m a g .o r g D o w n l o a d e d f r o m
and acquiring and using information about emo-tion is currently the subject of a substantial amount of research in psychology and neuro-science.The way to understand this relationship between bodily states of emotion and the manner in which humans encode,represent,and use emotional information is the topic of this article.In particular,I discuss insights that have been stimulated by theories of embodied cognition and show how such theories account for the embod-iment effects that you and Darwin might have been able to intuit.
Emotions and Theories of Embodied Cognition Until recently,psychologists and cognitive
scientists have spent little effort on the develop-ment of complete models of the mental pro-cessing of emotional information.This is true
in spite of the fact that such information priori-tizes attention (6),access to word meaning (7),
and the organization of material in memory (8).
For many scientists,emotion has
simply seemed fraught with too
many difficulties to be considered
as a tractable topic of study.
One way to avoid the prob-lems in studying emotions is to
make them go away.Classic
models of information processing
in the cognitive sciences allow
sensory,motor,and emotional
experience to be represented as
stripped of their perceptual and
experiential basis.In such mod-els,largely inspired by the meta-phor of “mind as computer,”
information taken in by the dif-ferent sense modalities is pre-served in memory in the form
of abstract symbols.These are
stored in a manner that is func-tionally separated from the origi-nal neural systems (those involved
in vision,olfaction,and audition,
for example)that encoded them
in the first place [(9,10);see (11)and (12)for discussion].Such information-processing models render what individuals know about emotion equivalent to what they know about most other things.Conveniently,the models
also do away with the priority of emotion in information processing.And the sensory,motor,and affective systems are not required for think-ing or language use.
There are other ways to think about infor-mation processing,and these ways are clustered under the label “theories of embodied cogni-tion.”Although this approach provides an original perspective and is based on methodo-logical and technological innovation,the basic idea is actually very old (13).The assertion common to recent instantiations of such theories is that high-level cognitive processes (such as thought and language)use partial reactivations of states in sensory,motor,and affective systems to do their jobs (14).Put another way,the grounding for knowledge —what it refers to —is the original neural state that occurred when the information was initially acquired.If this is true,then using knowledge is a lot like reliving past experience in at least some (and sometimes all)of its sensory,motor,and affective modalities:The brain captures modality-specific states dur-ing perception,action,and interoception and then reinstantiates parts of the same states to represent knowledge when needed.
Theories of embodied cognition have now been applied to provide rigorous accounts of emotion and the processing of information about emotion (5,15).In this regard,experienc-ing an emotion,perceiving an emotional stimulus,and retrieving an emotional memory all involve highly overlapping mental pro-cesses.One schematic way that this might
work is illustrated in Fig.2.As depicted,the perception of an emotional stimulus,such as a snarling bear,involves,among other responses,seeing,hearing,and feeling consciously afraid of the bear.Altogether,the neural,bodily,and subjective feeling state might be called “fear ”for the perceiver (although the same patterns might be called “exhilaration ”for another perceiver or for the same perceiver in a dif-ferent context).Populations of neurons in the modality-specific sensory,motor,and affective systems are highly interconnected,and their activation supports the integrated,multimodal experience of the bear.
Later,in just thinking about stumbling on the bear,the neural states that represent (for example)the visual impression of the bear can be reacti-vated.The reinstantiation of a pattern of neurons in one system can then cascade to complete the full pattern in the others.Through the intercon-nections of the populations of neurons that were active during the original experience,a partial multimodal reenactment of the experience is produced (16,17).Critically for such an account,one reason that only parts of the original neural
states are reactivated is that attention is selectively focused on the aspects of the experience that are
most salient and important for the individual.These then are the aspects that are most likely to be stored for later reactivation (12).Because emotions are salient and functional,this aspect of experience will certainly be preserved (8).In theories of embodied cognition,using knowledge —as in recalling memories,drawing inferences,and making plans —is thus called “embodied ”because an admittedly incomplete but cog-nitively useful reexperience is produced in the originally impli-cated sensory-motor systems,as if the individual were there in the very situation,the very emotional state,or with the very object of thought (18).The embodiment of anger might involve tension in muscles used to strike,the ener-vation of certain facial muscles to form a scowl,and even the rise in diastolic blood pressure and in peripheral resistance,for example.The concept of reenactment and related concepts such as simula-tion,resonance,and emulation are widely accepted in theories of embodied cognition,but many dif-ferent mechanistic neural accounts of it have been proposed (19).One promising possibility is that simulation is supported by special-ized “mirror neurons ”or even an entire “mirror neuron system,”which maps the correspondences between the observed and per-formed actions.However,there is much disagreement about the exact location of the mirror neurons,whether these neurons actually constitute a “system ”(in the sense of interconnected elements),and whether
there actually are specialized neurons dedicated to mirroring (or whether regular neurons can simply perform a mirroring function).Some of the original work on mirror neurons in monkeys emphasized a distinctive role of neurons located in the inferior parietal and inferior frontal cortex,which discharge both when a monkey performs an action and when it observes another individ-ual ’s action (20).The implications of this
work Fig.2.(Left )Activation of populations of neurons on visual,auditory,and affective systems upon perception of the snarling bear is illustrated schematically.(Right )Later,when remembering the appearance of the bear,parts of the original states of the visual system are reinstated.These then can act to reactivate the parts of the states that were originally active in the other systems (5).[Photo credit:Jim Zuckerman/CORBIS]
www.sciencemag.org
SCIENCE
VOL 316
18MAY 2007
1003
REVIEWS
o n N o v e m b e r 29, 2011
w w w .s c i e n c e m a g .o r g D o w n l o a d e d f r o m
were quickly extended to humans.Some scien-tists argue that humans have a dedicated “mirror neuron area,”located around the Broadmann ’s Area 44(the human homolog of the monkey F5region).This mirror neuron area may com-pute complex operations,such as mapping the correspondence between self and others or dif-ferentiating between goal-oriented versus non-intentional actions (20).But more questions about an architecture for embodied cognition have been raised than have been answered.The specifics of the underlying architecture will be one of the defining projects for neuroscience and neurophysiology in the coming years.
Perceiving Emotion One hypothesis regarding the application of
theories of embodied cognition to emotion is that
the perception of emotional meaning —recognizing
a facial expression of emotion or the words “snarl-ing bear ”—involves the embodiment of
the implied emotion (21).There is now
substantial empirical support for this hy-pothesis.Neuroimaging studies have re-vealed that recognizing a facial expression
of emotion in another person and ex-periencing that emotion oneself involve
overlapping neural circuits.In an illustra-tive study,researchers had participants
inhale odors that generated feelings of
disgust (22).The same participants then
watched videos of other individuals ex-pressing disgust.Results showed that
areas of the anterior insula and,to some
extent,the anterior cingulate cortex were
activated both when individuals observed
disgust in others and when they expe-rienced disgust themselves [related find-ings are reported in (23,24)].Similarly,behavioral studies demon-strate that emotional expressions and gestures are visibly imitated by observers and that this imitation is accompanied by self-reports of the associated emotional
state (25).Theories of embodied cognition pro-vide a theoretical account of why this is so:The imitation of other individuals ’emotional expres-sions is part of the bodily reenactment of the experience of the other ’s state.When emotional imitation goes smoothly,there is a strong foun-dation for empathy (26)and,therefore,even good marriages.Mimicking the facial expres-sions of your partner is good for your relation-ship,even if this means that you will grow to resemble each other because you repeatedly use the same facial muscles,as the findings of one study suggest (27).In contrast,there is evidence that relates failures in processes of
emotional imitation,such as those which occur in autism,with substantial problems in social interaction (28).
One important implication of this type of emotional resonance across individuals is its probable role in observational learning.In observational learning,the positive or negative consequences of a given behavior are learned by watching another individual experience these consequences.A recent functional magnetic res-onance imaging study revealed similar changes in brain activity of a female participant when painful stimulation was applied to her own hand and to her partner ’s hand (29).A related study used single-cell recording and found activation of pain-related neurons when a painful stimulus was applied to the participant ’s own hand and also when the patient watched the painful stim-ulus applied to the experimenter ’s hand (30).This suggests that observational learning is supported by a reenactment of the emotional ex-perience of the model in the observer.Although a direct test of such a claim is required,the same mechanism should underlie instructed learning.In instructed learning,neither the self nor another person ever experiences pain or pleasure.Rather,learning occurs through the transmission of
language.When children learn not to put their fingers in electrical outlets or to carelessly run into the street,their behavior is guided by verbal instruction,not direct experience.They must,therefore,be able to reexperience an emotion when that emotional consequence is described in language.Already published comparisons of amygdala activation during conditioned,obser-vational,and instructed fear-learning in humans are consistent with just such a view (31).The findings suggest that the emotional processes that support all three types of learning share important similarities.
Thinking About Emotion
In my own laboratory,we have demonstrated that using emotional information stored in mem-ory involves embodiment (32).In one study,experimental participants made judgments (they provided a “yes ”or “no ”response)about whether words referring to concrete objects (e.g.,“baby,”“slug ”)were associated with an emotion.The objects had been rated by other individuals as being strongly associated with the emotions of joy,disgust,anger,or no particular emotion.Dur-ing the task,the activation of four facial mus-cles (Fig.3)was recorded with a technique called electromyographic recording.In another study,the same method was followed but the words now referred to abstract concepts;they were ad-jectives that denoted affective states and condi-tions (e.g.,“joyful,”“enraged ”).
Results of both studies showed that,in making their judgments,individuals embodied the relevant,discrete emotion as indicated by their facial expressions.The findings indicate
that in the very brief time it took participants to
decide that a “slug ”was related to an emotion (less than 3s),they expressed disgust on their faces.They appeared to make their judgments on the basis of the embodiment of the referent (objects for the first study and emotional states for the second).Further support for such a conclusion comes from the re-sults of a second condition of each study.In fact,the experimenter in-structed half of the participants to make a different judgment about the words.Those participants indicated (“yes ”or “no ”)whether the words were written in capital letters.In order to make such judgments,these participants would not have to embody the emotional meaning of the words;indeed,findings revealed that these participants showed no system-atic activation of the facial musculature whatsoever.The point that embodiment does not occur when the information can be processed on the basis of association or perceptual features has been made in
other research as well (33,34).
Further evidence of the embodiment of emotional concepts was also obtained
in extensions of research on the costs of switching processing between sensory modalities to the area of emotion.Researchers have shown that shifting from processing in one modality to another involves temporal processing costs (35):Individuals take longer to judge the location of a visual stimulus after having just detected the location of an auditory one,for example,than if both stimuli arrive to the same modality.For the present concerns,it is of interest that similar “switching costs ”are also found when participants engage in con-ceptual tasks:Individuals are slower to say that typical instances of object categories have
certain features if those features are processed in different modalities (36).They are slower to verify that a “bomb ”can be “loud ”when they have just confirmed that a “lemon ”can be
“tart ”than compared to when,for example,they have just confirmed that “leaves ”can be “rustling.”This provides support for the gen-eral assertion made by theories of embodied cognition that individuals simulate objects
in Fig.3.The muscles associated with the facial expressions measured in recent work are shown.The orbicularis oculi and zygomaticus are activated to produce a smile,the
corrugator is activated during frowning in anger,and the levator is used to produce the grimace of disgust.
18MAY 2007VOL 316SCIENCE www.sciencemag.org
1004REVIEWS
o n N o v e m b e r 29, 2011
w w w .s c i e n c e m a g .o r g D o w n l o a d e d f r o m
the relevant modalities when they use them in thought and language.
V ermeulen and colleagues (37)examined switching costs in verifying properties of posi-tive and negative concepts such as “triumph ”and “victim.”Properties of these concepts were taken from vision,audition,and the affective system.Parallel to switching costs observed for neutral concepts,the study showed that,for positive and negative concepts,verifying prop-erties from different modalities produced costs such that reaction times were longer and error rates were higher than if no modality switching was required.This effect was observed when participants had to switch from the affective system to sensory modalities and vice versa.In other words,participants were less efficient in verifying that a “victim ”can be “stricken ”if the previous trial involved verifying that a “spider ”can be “black ”than they were if that previous trial involved verifying that an “orphan ”can be “hopeless.”And participants were less efficient in verifying that a “spider ”can be “black ”when that trial was preceded by the judgment that an “orphan ”can be “hopeless ”than if preceded by the judgment that a “wound ”can be “open.”This provides evidence that affective properties of concepts are simulated in the emotional system when the properties are the subject of active thought.
Comprehending Emotional Language
Developments in theories of embodied cogni-tion to account for language make the claim that language comprehension relies in part on em-bodied conceptualizations of the situations that language describes (38).The first step in language comprehension,then,is to index words or phrases to embodied states that refer to these objects.Next,the observer simulates possible interactions with the objects.Finally,the message is understood when a coherent set of actions is created.
Some evidence in support of such an ac-count of understanding emotional language was published almost 20years ago,though no fully developed model was available at the time to interpret the findings.In the study,some partic-ipants held a pencil between their front teeth while performing a laboratory task that involved rating the funniness of different cartoons (39).Holding the pen in the mouth this way covertly led the individuals to smile.Other participants were instructed to hold a pencil between their lips,without touching the pencil with their teeth,and this prevented them from smiling (Fig.1).Results revealed that,as suggested in the thought problem that began this article,individ-uals who were led to smile evaluated the cartoons as funnier than did participants whose smiles were blocked.It appeared that those
individuals who were smiling somehow “got ”the comic meaning of the cartoons better or easier than did the individuals who were pre-vented from smiling.
More evidence for simulation of emotions in sentence comprehension is now available (40).The reasoning that motivated the research was that if the comprehension of sentences with emotional meaning requires the partial reenact-ment of emotional bodily states,then reenact-ment of congruent (or incongruent)emotions should facilitate (or inhibit)language compre-hension.Participants had to judge whether the sentences described a pleasant or an unpleasant event,while holding a pen between the teeth (again,to induce smiling)or between the lips (to inhibit smiling).Reading times for understand-ing sentences describing pleasant events were faster when participants were smiling than times when particpants were prevented from smiling.Sentences that described unpleasant events were understood faster when participants were pre-vented from smiling than when they were smil-ing.The same effect was observed in a second experiment in which participants had to evaluate whether the sentences were easy or hard to understand.
Conclusions
Early critics of theories of embodied cognition argued that bodily feedback is too undif-ferentiated and too slow to represent emotional experience (41).In fact,the motor system alone can support extremely subtle distinctions.But,more importantly,recent theories of embodied cognition avoid such criticisms by focusing on the brain ’s modality-specific systems,not only on muscles and viscera.The circuits in modality-specific brain areas are fast,refined,and able to flexibly process a large number of states.These states can be reactivated without their output being observable in overt behavior.This account is ripe,therefore,to generate research that can further the understanding of learning,language comprehension,psychotherapeutic techniques,and attitudes and prejudice,just to name a few psychological phenomena.These days,those few seem to be pretty important.
References and Notes
1.S.Stepper,F.Strack,J.Pers.Soc.Psychol.,211(1993).
2.K.L.Duckworth,J.A.Bargh,M.Garcia,S.Chaiken,Psychol.Sci.13,513(2002).
3.G.Tom,P.Pettersen,T.Lau,T.Burton,J.Cook,Basic Appl.Soc.Psychol.12,281(1991).
4.C.Darwin,The Expression of Emotion in Man and Animals (John Murray,London,1872).
5.P.M.Niedenthal,L.W.Barsalou,F.Ric,S.Krauth-Gruber,in Emotion:Conscious and Unconscious ,L.F.Barrett,P.M.Niedenthal,P.Winkielman,Eds.(Guilford,New York,2005),pp.21–50.
6.A.Ohman,A.Flykt,F.Esteves,J.Exp.Psychol.Gen.130,466(2001).
7.L.C.Nygaard,E.R.Lunders,Mem.Cognit.30,583(2002).
8.P.M.Niedenthal,J.B.Halberstadt,A
˚.H.Innes-Ker,Psychol.Rev.106,337(1999).
9.J.Fodor,The Language of Thought (Harvard Univ.Press,Cambridge,MA,1975).
10.A.Newell,Cognit.Sci.4,135(1980).
11.L.W.Barsalou,Behav.Brain Sci.22,577(1999).12.L.W.Barsalou,Lang.Cognit.Process 18,513
(2003).
13.J.J.Prinz,Furnishing the Mind:Concepts and Their
Perceptual Basis (Massachusetts Institute of Technology Press,Cambridge,MA,2002).
14.M.Wilson,Psychon.Bull.Rev.9,625(2002).
15.A.R.Damasio,Descartes ’Error:Emotion,Reason,and
the Human Brain (Grosset/Putnam,New York,1994).16.A.R.Damasio,Cognition 33,25(19).
17.L.W.Barsalou,P.M.Niedenthal,A.Barbey,J.Ruppert,
in The Psychology of Learning and Motivation ,B.H.Ross,Ed.(Academic,San Diego,CA,2003),vol.43,pp.43–92.18.V.Gallese,Psychopathology 36,171(2003).
19.V.Gallese,G.Lakoff,Cogn.Neuropsychol.22,455
(2005).
20.V.Gallese,C.Keysers,G.Rizzolatti,Trends Cognit.Sci.8,
396(2004).
21.R.Adolphs,Behav.Cognit.Neurosci.Rev.1,21
(2002).
22.B.Wicker et al.,Neuron 40,655(2003).
23.A.D.Lawrence,A.J.Calder,S.W.McGowan,P.M.Grasby,
Neuroreport 13,881(2002).
24.L.Carr,M.Iacoboni,M.C.Dubeau,J.C.Mazziotta,
G.L.Lenzi,Proc.Natl.Acad.Sci.U.S.A.100,5497(2003).
25.T.L.Chartrand,J.A.Bargh,J.Pers.Soc.Psychol.76,3
(1999).
26.J.Decety,P.L.Jackson,Behav.Cognit.Neurosci.Rev.3,
71(2004).
27.R.B.Zajonc,P.K.Adelmann,S.T.Murphy,
P.M.Niedenthal,Motiv.Emotion 11,335(1987).28.D.R.McIntosh,A.Reichmann-Decker,P.Winkielman,
J.Wilbarger,Dev.Sci.9,295(2006).
29.T.Singer et al.,Science 303,1157(2004).
30.W.D.Hutchison,K.D.Davis,A.M.Lozano,R.R.Tasker,
J.O.Dostrovsky,Nat.Neurosci.2,403(1999).31.E.A.Phelps et al.,Nat.Neurosci.4,437(2001).32.L.Mondillon,P.M.Niedenthal,P.Winkielman,
N.Vermeulen,J.Pers.Soc.Psychol.,unpublished data.33.K.O.Solomon,L.W.Barsalou,Mem.Cognit.32,244
(2004).
34.F.Strack,N.Schwarz,E.Gschneidinger,J.Pers.Soc.
Psychol.49,1460(1985).
35.C.Spence,M.E.Nicholls,J.Driver,Percept.Psychophys.
63,330(2001).
36.D.Pecher,R.Zeelenberg,L.W.Barsalou,Psychol.Sci.
14,119(2003).
37.N.Vermeulen,P.M.Niedenthal,O.Luminet,Cognit.Sci.
31,183(2007).
38.A.M.Glenberg,D.A.Robinson,J.Mem.Lang.43,379
(2000).
39.F.Strack,L.L.Martin,S.Stepper,J.Pers.Soc.Psychol.
54,768(1988).
40.D.A.Havas,A.M.Glenberg,M.Rinck,Psychon.Bull.
Rev.,in press.
41.W.B.Cannon,Am.J.Psychol.39,115(1927).
42.R.Larsen,M.Kasimatis,K.Frey,Cogn.Emotion 6,321
(1992).
43.This paper was written while the author was on sabbatical
at the University of Wisconsin at Madison.She thanks L.Barrett,L.Barsalou,M.Brauer,R.Davidson,A.Glenberg,R.Nowak,S.Pollak,F.Strack,and D.Wegner for their readings of and helpful input on previous versions of the article.NSF grant BCS-0350687(to P.Winkielman and P.N.)supported the preparation of this manuscript.10.1126/science.1136930
www.sciencemag.org SCIENCE VOL 31618MAY 20071005
REVIEWS
o n N o v e m b e r 29, 2011
w w w .s c i e n c e m a g .o r g D o w n l o a d e d f r o m下载本文
